Introduction
Vladimir Putin, the “Machiavellian grandmaster of geopolitical skulduggery,” (CNN, 2017) has been ubiquitous in the news in the last few years. His bullish foreign policy, violently repressive domestic policy, and alarmingly high approval rating have catapulted him to the centre stage of wold politics. How is it that Putin is so successful, and why is it that he is so often called Machiavellian?
Obiter Dicta
This is in no way meant to be an endorsement of Vladimir Putin’s tactics or authoritarian tendencies. I intend this blog post to merely analyse how, if at all, Putin has adhered to the political nostrums outlined in Machiavelli’s “The Prince”. Any statements of praise are simply an acknowledgement of his undeniable propensity for seizing and retaining power. His social rhetoric and political actions have been, in my opinion, reprehensible.
All quotes are from the Penguin Classics version of Machiavelli’s “The Prince”, the Tim Park translation.
Fear and Love
“Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than feared or feared than loved? One should wish to be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it is much safer to be feared than loved.” (66)
The concept of fearing a politician is perhaps alien to 21st century westerners, but in 16th century Italy or modern Russia, politicians certainly wield power to be feared. This is perhaps Machiavelli’s most famous quote, and the quote which is most embodied by President Putin. In 2016, the Washington Post put Putin’s approval rating at 83%. He is certainly loved by his people. These statistics continued to be upheld by polls collected by domestic Russian organisations and foreign new sources. An approval rating of 83% is mind blowing when compared to the popularity of western politicians, exempting perhaps our glorious Michael D Higgins. Putin’s popularity is particularly shocking when juxtaposed with the violent foreign policy and domestic oppression Putin is famous for in Western Europe.
It is for this reason he is feared. He has continually menaced Eastern European states that attempt to join NATO or the European Union for protection against Russian economic or military aggression. Putin defends these actions by mentioning the large ethnic Russian minorities in these countries. This “playing with fire” is approved of by many Russians as they see this as a rebellion against an economically oppressive west. Furthermore, political enemies of Putin tend to spontaneously die or be murdered. Whether these killings can be directly traced back to Putin himself is dubious, but it certainly is too suspicious to ignore entirely. He has certainly engendered an environment where the media and independent politicians have reason to fear him. The macho culture of Russia also allows for a greater level of acceptance for Putin’s boorish displays of masculinity and power.
While many of us would disagree with Putin’s tactics, Machiavelli might be impressed by them or convinced of their efficacy.
Friends and Foes
“A ruler will also be respected when he is a genuine friend and a genuine enemy, that is, when he declares himself unambiguously for one side and against the other. This policy will always bring better results than neutrality… Indecisive rulers who want to avoid immediate danger usually decide to stay neutral, and usually things end badly for them” (88).
One thing that can certainly be said about Putin is that he is decisive. He is loyal to his friends, and ruthless towards his enemies. For example, Anatoly Sobchak, a contemporary of Putin’s at University and later mayor of Saint Petersburg was ousted from the country due to corruption, however, when Putin held enough political sway, he forced the charges to be dropped on his friend and allowed them back into the country.
One of the greatest challenges facing Putin in his presidency were the Russian oligarchs, a class of billionaire businessmen that had remained practically above the government and the law since the Soviet Union collapsed. Putin immediately set to restructuring this. He proposed a deal to the oligarchs, those who accepted retained their power and privilege in society but lost some of their political influence. The savvy among them accepted this deal, seeing it as the last olive branch before a coming storm. They were correct. Putin quickly moved on the obdurate oligarchs, he forced some into political exile, nationalised a few of their billion-dollar businesses, and had others arrested and imprisoned. Despite the questionable legality of these attacks, it was seen as a cleansing of corruption by many Russians. Putin showed with vociferous clarity that it was much easier to cooperate with his new regime than to oppose it.
Area of Influence
“Take care that no foreign power strong enough to compete with his own gets a chance to penetrate the area” (10)
Russia has certainly been opposed to what they perceive as Western meddling in the Baltic States, Finland, and Central Asia. It is for this reason that many of these countries shy away from joining bureaucratic bodies like the EU, NATO, etc. These nations fear Russian military intervention or are dependent on Russian natural resources such as oil or timber. Thus, to provoke Russia’s political wrath is to jeopardise the economic viability of one’s country. Putin has been very vocal and does his best to paint himself as a patriotic warrior fighting for Russia’s interests against a sea of oppressive enemies. And contrary to what might seem obvious to Western Europeans, many Russians see this aggressive foreign policy as a form of defence of the sovereignty of Russia. With the recent annexation of Crimea in the Ukraine, it is clear that Russia was testing the waters in the international community and establishing its dominance in the politics of the region.
Conclusion
Putin does seem to abide by many of the principles outlined by Machiavelli in “The Prince”. His ruthlessness and cunning are certainly reminiscent of Machiavelli’s muse Borgia. All that can be hoped is that a similarly astute leader with more benevolent goals for Russia rises to power in the near future.
References:
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Machiavelli, N. (1532). The Prince. Florence.
Nikitin, V. (2013). On Syria, Putin is a modern Machiavelli – and that's a good thing | Vadim Nikitin. [online] the Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/13/putin-syria-machiavelli-nyt-op-ed [Accessed 23 Mar. 2019].
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